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I 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellee Woods 
Cross, a municipal corporation, and the Defendant/Appellant Craig 
Kirk. 
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IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 78-2a-3(d). 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
Issues of Fact: 
a) did the trial court err in concluding that the 
Appellant owned the property located at 1450 West 500 South, 
Woods Cross, Utah? 
b) did the trial court err in concluding that the property 
located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross, Utah is zoned A-l? 
c) did the trial court err in concluding that the 
Appellant was violating the Zoning Ordinances of Woods Cross in 
the Appellant's use of the property located at 1450 West 500 
South, Woods Cross, Utah? 
d) did the trial court err in concluding that the 
Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, 
Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens made on personal knowledge and 
,therefore, admissible in support of Appellee's Summary Judgment 
Motion? 
Standard of review for issues of fact: 
Issues of fact may be reversed on appeal only if they are 
5 
found to be clearly erroneous. Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 
919 (Utah 1988). 
Issues of Law: 
a) did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting 
the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
b) did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact 
present which precluded the trial court from granting the 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
c) did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing 
to grant the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss? 
d) did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing 
to hear and rule on the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss prior to 
ruling on the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
e) did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing 
to hear or rule on the Appellant's Motions to Strike the 
Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, 
Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens before granting the Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment? 
f) did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
concluding that Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie 
Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were competent to testify 
to the alleged facts set forth in their Affidavits? 
g) did the trial court err as a matter of law in 
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Sinaelton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 
126 (1967) 
Sorenson v, Beers, 585 P.2d 485 (Utah 1978) 
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 
412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966) 
Thompson v, Ford Motor Co,, 16 Utah 2d 30, 
395 P.2d 62 (1964) 
Walker v. Rockey Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538 (1973) 
Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomauist, 
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972) 
Rules: 
Utah Rules of Civi l Procedure, Rule 56 
Statutes: 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 78-2a-3(d) 
vn 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal to this Court from the trial court's 
grant of Summary Judgment, entered on March 24, 1993, in favor of 
the Appellee and against the Appellant on Appellee's claims that 
the Appellee is entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting 
the Appellant from using the property located at 1450 West 500 
South, Woods Cross City, Utah for industrial and/or commercial 
8 
concluding that the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
timely? 
Standard of review for issues of law: 
Issues of law are subject to de novo review by an appellate 
court, and the court gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law. Elue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1989). 
VI 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES,RULES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Cases: 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 
779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) 
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc.. 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960) 
Cornish Town v. Roller. 758 P.2d 919 (1988) 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, &65 P.2d 1277 (1987) 
Freed Fin Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.f 537 P.2d 1039 
(Utah 1975) 
Holbrook Co. V. Adams. 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) 
Judkins v. Toone. 27, Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972) 
Lockhart v. Anderson. 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982) 
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel. 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 
297 (1953) 
Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) 
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8. The trial court never entertained any argument on the 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. 
9. The trial court never entertained any argument on the 
Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, 
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens. 
10. On March 9, 1993, the trial court granted the 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. The Summary Judgment Motion was entered on March 24, 
1993. 
12. The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on April 23, 
1993. 
(C) 
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRL4L COURT 
The trial court granted the Appellee's Summary Judgment 
Motion on April 9, 1993, without entertaining argument on or 
addressing the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss or his Motion to 
Strike or the Appellant's Counterclaim. 
(D) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Appellant is the owner of real property located in 
Woods Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 141, f 4). 
2. On August 12, 1992, the Appellee served the Appellant 
with a Summons and Complaint alleging that the Appellant was the 
owner of real property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 6). 
10 
uses, and that the Appellee is entitled to a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the Appellant from conducting a business on the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City. 
(B) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
1. On August 12, 1992, the Appellee served the Appellant 
with a Summons and Complaint alleging that the Appellant was the 
owner of real property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Utah. The Appellant filed an Amended Answer, on or 
about, October 19, 1992. 
2. The Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, on or 
about, November 2, 1992. 
3. The Appellant filed Motions to Strike the Affidavits of 
Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, 
and Tim Stephens, which were submitted in support of Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, on or about December 8, 1992. 
4. The Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss on or about 
December 18, 1992. 
5. The Appellee filed a Notice to Submit its Summary 
Judgment Motion for decision on, or about, December 2, 1992. 
6. The Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings on, or 
about, January 14, 1993. 
7. The Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard on 
or about February 11, 1993. 
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3. In its Complaint, the Appellee alleged that the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah 
is zoned A-l Agricultural. (Record at page 1-2). 
4. In paragraph No. 4 of its Complaint, the Appellee 
asserts that the Appellant applied for a building permit to build 
a barn on the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 2). 
5. In paragraph No. 6 of its Complaint, the Appellee 
alleges that the Appellant is using the property located at 1450 
West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, for industrial purposes 
in violation of the Woods Cross City zoning ordinances. (Record 
at page 2-3). 
6. In paragraphs 9-10, the Appellee asserts that it is 
entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting the Appellant from 
using the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross 
City, Utah, for industrial and/or commercial uses. (Record at 
page 3). 
7. In paragraphs 12-13, the Appellee asserts that it is 
entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting the Appellant from 
conducting a business on the property located at 1450 West 500 
South, Woods Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 4). 
8. The Appellant is not the owner of the property located 
at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 
141, H 2). 
9. The Appellant has never claimed to own the property 
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located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah. (Record 
at page 141, H 2) . 
10. The property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Utah, is on the opposite side of the street from the 
property owned by the Appellant that is located on 500 South in 
Woods Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 141, fl 3). 
11. The Appellant does not conduct any business on the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah. 
(Record at page 141, f 5). 
12. The Appellant does not park any of his vehicles or 
equipment on the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Utah. (Record at page 141, f 7). 
13. The property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Utah, is not zoned A-l, but rather is zoned 1-1. 
(Record at page 60). 
14. The Appellant filed an Answer on, or about, September 
1, 1992. (Record at page 10-23). 
15. The Appellant filed an Amended Answer on, or about, 
October 19, 1992. (Record at page 30-36). 
16. The Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on, or 
about, November 2, 1992. (Record at page 38). 
17. The Appellant filed Motions to Strike the Affidavits of 
Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, 
and Tim Stephens, which were submitted in support of Appellee's 
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Motion for Summary Judgment, on or about, December 8, 1992. 
(Record at page 85-109). 
18. The Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss on, or about, 
December 18, 1992. (Record at page 129-143). 
19. The Appellee filed a Notice to Submit its Summary 
Judgment Motion for decision on, or about, December 22, 1993. 
(Record at page 173). 
20. The Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings on, or 
about, January 14, 1993. (Record at page 184). 
21. The Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard 
on, or about, February 11, 1993. (Record at page 217). 
22. The trial court never entertained argument on the 
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. (Record at page 213-214). 
23. The trial court never entertained argument on the 
Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, 
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens. 
(Record at page 213-214). 
24. The trial court never entertained argument on the 
Appellant's Counterclaim or Affirmative Defenses. (Record at 
page 213-214). 
25. On March 24, 1993, the trial court granted the 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at page 217-
218) . 
26. Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellee was entered 
on March 24, 1993. (Record at page 217). 
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27. The Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on April 23, 
1993. (Record at page 221-222). 
28. On October 14, 1993 the trial Court granted Appellant's 
Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal. (Record at page 231). 
Vffl 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred, both as a matter of fact and as a 
matter of law, in granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The trial court erred, both as a matter of fact and 
as a matter of law, in concluding that the Appellee was entitled 
to summary judgment on its cause of action against the Appellant 
for conducting business without a license. The trial court 
erred, as a matter of law, in granting the Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Appellant's Counterclaim and/or 
affirmative defenses. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, 
in granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment without 
first ruling on the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss Appellee's 
complaint and without first ruling on Appellant's Motions to 
Strike the affidavits submitted in support of Appellee's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. The trial court erred, as a mater of law, 
in ruling on Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment before the 
Appellant had the opportunity to conduct discovery and submit 
evidence on his Counterclaim and affirmative defenses. 
14 
IX 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER 
OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND LAW IN 
GRANTING THE APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION. 
With respect to Appellee's cause of action for a "Permanent 
Injunction", the trial court erred both as a matter of fact and 
as a matter of law in concluding that there was no a genuine 
issue of fact with respect to whether or not the Appellant is 
violating any Woods Cross City zoning ordinances. Because the 
Appellant is not the owner of the property located at 1450 West 
500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, has never conducted any 
business on that property nor ever parked any vehicles on that 
property, the trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a 
matter of law in concluding that the Appellant is violating any 
Woods Cross City zoning ordinances. 
Additionally a genuine issue of fact exists as to the actual 
zoning of the property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods 
Cross City, Utah. The Appellee asserts that the property is 
zoned A-l; however, the Woods Cross City Zoning Map shows the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah 
is zoned 1-1 rather than A-l. 
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Because there are genuine issues of fact present in this 
case, the Appellee was not entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law. It takes only one sworn statement to dispute 
averments on the other side of a controversy and create an issue 
of fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. V. Adams, 542 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). The Affidavit filed by the Appellant 
disputed the Appelleefs statement of facts in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and created genuine issues of 
material fact in this case. 
On a motion for summary judgment the adverse party is 
entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
him. Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Thompson 
v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964); Morris v. 
Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953). In ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment, the court may only consider 
facts that are not in dispute. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 485 
(Utah 1978). 
In this case the trial court ignored the disputed facts and 
weighed the evidence. On summary judgment a court cannot 
consider the weight of testimony or credibility of witnesses; the 
court simply determines whether or not a material issue of facts 
is present in the case and whether or not one party should 
prevail as a matter of law. Sandbera v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 
(Utah 1978); Sinaelton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 
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(1967). Therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial and 
reversible error, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law 
in granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and 
remanded. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPELLEE WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ITS CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CONDUCTING BUSINESS 
WITHOUT A LICENSE. 
At the trial court level, the Appellee did not produced one 
iota of evidence which supported its assertion that the Appellant 
is conducting business on the property located at 1450 West 500 
South, Woods Cross City, Utah, with or without a business 
license. The only evidence before the trial court with respect 
to the Appellant's alleged use of the property located at 1450 
West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, are statements from 
several individuals wherein they state that they have seen large 
trucks enter and leave the property and seen trucks and/or 
equipment parked on the property. 
Trucks entering and leaving property located at 1450 West 
500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, or trucks parked on the 
property does not establish the existence of a business on the 
property. Furthermore, the Appellant dees not own the property 
located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, and, 
therefore, the Appellant is not liable nor responsible for the 
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activities which might occur on the property. Additionally, the 
Appellant stated in his uncontested Affidavit that he is not 
conducting any business activity on the property, that he has no 
telephone on the property and that he stores no material on the 
property. A party may not rely on allegations in the pleadings 
to counter affidavits made upon personal knowledge stating facts 
contrary to those alleged in pleadings. Freed Fin Co. v. Stoker 
Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975). 
Because the Appellee did not produce, and cannot produce, 
any evidence supporting its assertion that the Appellant is 
conducting any business on the property located at 1450 West 500 
South, Woods Cross City, Utah, and because the Appellee did not 
file any affidavits contradicting the Appellant's Affidavit 
specifically declaring that he is not conducting business on the 
property located at 1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, 
the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error, both 
as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, in granting the 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the trial 
court's decision must be reversed and remanded. 
POINT m 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPELLEE WAS 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In order for the Appellee t o preva i l on i t s Motion for 
Summary Judgment a t the t r i a l court l e v e l , the Appellee had t o 
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demonstrate that: 1) there were no issues of material fact 
present in this matter which precluded the trial court from 
granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellee, and 
2) that the Appellee was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter 
of law. As established in by Appellant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, genuine 
issues of material fact are present which preclude the trail 
court from granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, the Appellee did not, and could not, establish that 
it was entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
It is an indisputable principal of law that on a summary 
judgment motion, the trial court must review the facts and law in 
the light most favorable to the party against whom Summary 
Judgment is sought. See Judkins v. Toone, 27, Utah 2d 17, 492 
P.2d 980 (1972). A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the loser, show that "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law" such showing 
must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if 
given a trial, produce evidence which reasonably sustain a 
judgment in his favor. Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc., 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960). Therefore, because the 
Appellee did not, and cannot, demonstrate that the Appellant has 
engaged in any prohibited activity, on the property located at 
19 
1450 West 500 South, Woods Cross City, Utah, the Appellee was not 
entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. Even if there 
is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is proper 
only if the pleadings and other documents demonstrate that the 
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Lockhart v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). 
In order for the Appellee to assert that it is legally 
entitled to a permanent injunction against the Appellant, the 
Appellee must first establish that the Appellant has engaged in 
some prohibited action sought to be enjoined. The Appellee did 
not established that the Appellant is engaging any such 
prohibited activities on the property located at 1450 West 500 
South, Woods Cross City, Utah. Nor did the Appellee demonstrated 
that any of the alleged actions, even if committed by the 
Appellant, are a violation of the Woods Cross City zoning 
ordinances. Therefore, the Appellee did not established that it 
is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. The trial 
court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted 
the Appelleefs Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the 
trial court's decision must be reversed and remanded. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE APPELLANTS 
COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
At the trial court level, the Appellee asserted that it was 
20 
entitled to Summary Judgment on the Appellant's Counterclaim for 
the reason that the Appellant had not exhausted his 
administrative remedies. The Appellee then cited the trial court 
to a number of cases v/herein a party was precluded from asserting 
certain causes of action or raising certain defenses because that 
party failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by failing 
to request any relief from the appropriate administrative agency. 
Those cases were not applicable to the facts of this case for the 
reason that the Appellant was attempting to exhaust his 
administrative remedies while the Appellee was seeking to 
preclude the Appellant from exhausting those remedies through 
this litigation. 
In the cases cited by the Appellee, the parties were only 
precluded from asserting defenses or claims for the reason that 
they had not attempted to solve their dilemmas through 
appropriate administrative procedures. In the instant matter, 
unlike the parties in the cases cited by the Appellee, the 
Appellant attempted to follow the appropriate administrative 
procedure with respect to his property located at 1473 West 500 
South, Woods Cross City, Utah. 
The Appellant timely and properly petitioned Woods Cross 
City for a change in the zoning of his property. The Woods Cross 
Zoning Commission granted that petition. The Woods Cross City 
Council, however, subsequently denied the Appellant's petition 
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for no specified reason, and the Appellant filed an appeal of 
that denial with the Second District Court. 
The Appellant complied with his administrative remedies 
prior to the time the trial court granted Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Therefore, the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error in summarily granting summary 
judgment on the Appellee's Counterclaim and affirmative defenses. 
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and 
remanded. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT FIRST RULING 
ON THE APPELLANTS MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLEE'S COMPLAINT AND 
WITHOUT FIRST RULING ON APPELLANTS MOTIONS TO STRIKE THE 
AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
I t i s an undisputed f a c t tha t the t r i a l court never ruled on 
Appe l lant ' s Motion t o d ismiss Appe l l ee ' s Complaint or on 
Appe l lant ' s Motions t o S tr ike the A f f i d a v i t s of Brent Stephenson, 
Gayle Stephenson, L e s l i e Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens, 
which were submitted in support of Appe l l ee ' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The A f f i d a v i t s of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, 
L e s l i e Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were submitted in 
support of Appe l l ee ' s Motion for Summary Judgment and were a 
pr inc ipa l part of the Appe l l ee ' s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The A f f i d a v i t s a l l e g e d l y e s t a b l i s h e d the Appe l lant ' s v i o l a t i o n s 
complained of in Appe l l ee ' s Complaint. 
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The Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, Leslie 
Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens were based on hearsay, 
speculation, conclusion, and opinion, and therefore, were not 
admissible under the prqvisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Hearsay and opinion testimony that would not 
be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be 
set forth in an affidavit supporting a motion for summary 
judgment. Walker v. Rockey Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538 (1973); Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. 
Blomcruist. 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972). Therefore, 
the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when 
it failed to consider or rule on the Appellant's Motions to 
Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, Gayle Stephenson, 
Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens prior to granting 
the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court 
committed prejudicial and reversible error in failing to rule on 
Appellant's Motions to Strike the Affidavits of Brent Stephenson, 
Gayle Stephenson, Leslie Gertsch, Duro Gertsch, and Tim Stephens 
prior to granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and 
remanded. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATER OF LAW, IN RULING ON 
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE THE APPELLANT 
HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND SUBMIT 
EVIDENCE ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. 
Generally if discovery is incomplete summary judgment should 
not be granted, because information ascertained through discovery 
may reveal information that would create issues of fact, thus 
precluding summary judgment. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 
740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, &65 P.2d 1277 (1987). 
In the instant matter, the Appellant never had the opportunity to 
conduct any discovery. The Appellant was entitled to conduct 
discovery. Discovery should be liberally permitted. State ex 
rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (Utah 
1966). 
In this matter, the trial court.simply entertained and 
granted the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment without 
permitting the Appellant to conduct discovery and without 
permitting the Appellant to develop his Counterclaim or 
affirmative defenses. The trial court committed prejudicial and 
reversible error by entertaining and ruling on Appellee's Motion 
for Summary Judgment before discovery was complete and the 
Appellant had the opportunity to develop and present information 
supporting his Counterclaim and affirmative defenses. 
Consequently, the trial court's decision must be reversed and 
remanded. 
24 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error 
when it granted the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgement. 
Therefore, the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment must be 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
WHEREFORE, the Appellant respectfully request that the 
Summary Judgment entered by the trial court be reversed and this 
matter be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this< •=t/\ day o f May 1994 . 
CharlesAT Schultz 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
7? 
I hereby certify that on the "^ day of May 1994, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief to the 
persons at the addresses listed below by depositing a copy in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid. 
Michael Z. Hayes 
MAZURAN & HAYES P.C. 
1245 East Brickyard Road Suite 250 
SLC, UT 84106 
Charles A. Schultz 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §78-2a-3(d) 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUKfc 
set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue Downey State Bank v Major 
Blakeney Corp , 545 P 2d 507 (Utah 1976) 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer 
tamty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits Locke v Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P 2d 1111 (1955) 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued Fibreboard 
Paper Prods Corp v Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P2d 1005 (1970) 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date objection was never heard re 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v Ham* 
mon, 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977) 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment 
Buckner v Main Realty & Ins Co , 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P 2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co v Jensen supra, and Rule 58A(d)) 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965), 
J P W Enters , Inc v Naef, 604 P 2d M 
(Utah 1979), Katz v Pierce 732 P 2d 92 (Utah 
1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Gra-
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213 
C.J.S. — 49 C J S Judgments §^ 187 to 218 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to ha 
bihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L R 3d 
1070 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L R 3d 
1272 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A L R 3d 586 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney'! 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A L R3d 
1255 
Failure to give notice f application for de 
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A L R 3d 1383 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A L R 3d 303 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A L R Fed 190 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 92 to 134 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
47 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
leadings and the evidence bef-^p it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
racticable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
?rsy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
lall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
antial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
,her relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
:tion as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
»emed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ig and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
rth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
vely that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein, 
vorn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
t shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
ts to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
pported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
ere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
ere is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ent, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
Idavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
plication for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
tained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
ler order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
g court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
? presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
thwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
lount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
n to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
orney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
lompiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
e 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
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Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges Assignment to panelb 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals The Court of Appeals by rale shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the coAirt 
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels, 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court, 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals, and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to lbsue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court, 
(ei interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony, 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex 
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a fin* 
degree or capital felony, 
d) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cut-
tody, support visitation, adoption, and paternity 
(j) appealb from the Utah Military Court, and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeal* 
from the Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the rr-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings MI 
78-2as4. Review of actions by Supreme Court 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of iht 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of ceru 
oran to the Supreme Court 1M 
78-2a*5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its pi incipal location to 
Salt Lake City The Court of Appeals may perforn 
any of its functions in any location within the state 
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CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78 3 2 Repealed 
78-3-3 Term of judges — Vacancy 
78-3-4 Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to or 
cuit court — Appeals — Junsdicuot 
when circuit and district court 
merged 
78-3-5 Repealed 
78-3-6 Terms — Minimum of once quarterlj 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11 Repealed 
78-3-11 5 State District Court Administraim 
System 
78-3-12 Repealed 
78-3-12 5 Costs of system 
78-3-13 Repealed 
78-3-13 4 Counties joining court system — Pi* 
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78-3-13 5, 78-3-14 Repealed 
78-3-14 5 Allocation of district court fees ud 
fines 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17 Repealed 
78-3-17 5 Application of savings accruing te 
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78-3-18 Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title 
78-3-19 Purpose of act 
78-3-20 Definitions 
78-3-21 Judicial Council — Creation — Hm 
bers — Terms and election — Ir 
sponsibihties — Reports 
78-3-21 5 Data bases for judicial boards 
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pomtment — Qualifications — S4 
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78-3-24 Court administrator — Powers, 4* 
ties, and responsibilities 
